\n <\/p>\n
\nThe following extended deduction allows us to draw out various
\nalternatives to the problem of free‑will. Each view will respond differently to
\nthese premises.<\/p>\n
\n1. The thesis of universal determinism is true.<\/p>\n
\n2. Universal determinism is not compatible with free‑will.<\/p>\n
\n3. Hence, there is no free‑will.<\/p>\n
\n4. If there are no free wills, then humans are not responsible
\nfor their actions.<\/p>\n
\n5. If humans are not responsible for their actions, then there is
\nno reason to blame or praise them.<\/p>\n
\nHard determinism accepts all premises as true and therefore
\naccepts all the conclusions. As there is no rational foundation for praise or
\nblame, hard determinists usually propose a behavioristic approach to human
\nproblems. All punishment would then be practical, future‑oriented
\nrehabilitation. In practice, the \ufffdsoft\ufffd determinist and hard determinist would
\nuse the same methods. Theoretically, the soft determinist believes that a
\nrevised concept of moral responsibility is intelligible within the confines of
\nuniversal determinism.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\nThe following is a syllogism that attempts to prove hard
\ndeterminism.<\/p>\n
\n1. All events in nature are determined by physical forces.<\/p>\n
\n2. All human actions are events in nature.<\/p>\n
\n3. Therefore, all human actions are determined by physical force.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\nIt would be quite difficult to deny the truth of the second
\npremise, but there is no reason for a non‑materialist to accept the first
\npremise as true. If Karl Popper and John Eccles are correct in assuming there is
\nsuch a thing as \ufffddownward\ufffd causation from the mind to physical events, then this
\nrepresents a plausible alternative to the view expressed in the first premise.
\nDeterminists cannot force us to accept the first premise until they have
\nconvinced us of the validity of the materialist arguments.<\/p>\n
\nMartin Buber poetically expresses this position: \ufffdThe unlimited
\nsway of causality in the it‑world, which is of fundamental importance for the
\nscientific ordering of nature, is not felt to be oppressive by the man who is
\nnot confined to the it‑world, but free to step out of it again and again into
\nthe world of relation. Here I and Thou confront each other freely in a
\nreciprocity that is not involved in or tainted by any causality; here man finds
\nguaranteed the freedom of this being and of being.\ufffd1<\/span>
\n<\/sup>Some authors
\n(such as Halverson) call this view \ufffdlibertarianism,\ufffd but I prefer to reserve
\nthis term for political philosophy. I use the adjective \ufffdradical\ufffd to qualify
\n\ufffdfree‑will theory,\ufffd because \ufffdteleological compatiblist\ufffd still assumes a
\nself‑determining will.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\nRadical free‑will theorists accept the second premise, but reject
\nthe first; therefore, none of the conclusions follow. For the sophisticated
\nfree‑will theorist determinism is true, but it is not universal. It would be
\nfoolish to insist that the events in the natural world on which we rely for our
\nnormal activities are exempt from cause and effect. The free‑will theorist need
\nonly have some indeterminism, so that voluntary events for which we can be
\npraised or blamed can have an acausal or contra‑causal basis.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\nSome free‑will theorists have used Heisenberg’s \ufffdindeterminancy
\nprinciple\ufffd as support for the indeterminism they need for the will to operate.
\nThere are at least two grave problems with this view. First, some believe that
\nthe indeterminism of particle physics is epistemological only; that is, it
\ninvolves an uncertainty in our knowledge about atomic particles. (After all, if
\nan electron had consciousness, it would certainly \ufffdknow\ufffd where and what it was.)
\nSecond, even if there is true metaphysical indeterminism at the subatomic level,
\nthis would actually be the worst possible basis for a self‑determining will.
\nThere is a world of difference between chaotic subatomic events and the
\ndeliberate actions of the human will. Hick phrases the point well: \ufffdIt is very
\ndifficult to see how such concepts as responsibility and obligation could have
\nany application if human volitions occurred at random instead of flowing from
\nthe individual nature of the agent. From the point of view of ethics the cost
\nof equating freedom with volitional randomness would thus be so great as to be
\nprohibitive.\ufffd2<\/sup><\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\nA common line of argument for radical free‑will theory is the
\nappeal to the fact that we deliberate. If hard determinism is true, decisions
\nought to come as soon as the right causes and conditions are in place.
\nAccording to universal determinism, effects ought to spring immediately and
\nunhesitatingly from their antecedent causes. The behaviorist, however, has a
\nquite plausible counter‑ argument to this. The reason why we deliberate is that
\nthere exists certain sets of conditioning which are of equal \ufffdstrength.\ufffd One
\ncould visualize this as a sort of tug‑of‑war in the mind of a college student
\nwho is caught between \ufffddoing his duty\ufffd (making up an exam) or \ufffdhaving a good
\ntime\ufffd (going to the Phi Delt’s Turtle Race). In Leviathan<\/i> Thomas Hobbes
\ngives a similar argument: \ufffdWhen in the mind of man, appetite, and aversions,
\nhopes, and fears, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and
\ndiverse good and evil consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing
\npropounded, come successively into our thoughts, so that sometimes we have an
\nappetite to it; sometimes an aversion from it; sometimes hope to be able to do
\nit; sometimes despair, or fear to attempt it; the whole sum of desires,
\naversions, hopes and fears continued will the thing be either done, or thought
\nimpossible, is that we call deliberation.\ufffd As a determinist and
\nproto‑behaviorist, Hobbes defines the will as the \ufffdlast act\ufffd of deliberation.<\/p>\n
\nHard determinism and radical free‑will theory are sometimes
\ncalled \ufffdincompatiblist\ufffd theories, because they both believe that the second
\npremise of our deduction above is true \ufffd that universal determinism is
\nincompatible with free‑will. Hard determinism chooses determinism over
\nfree‑will and the radical free‑will theorist does just the opposite. \ufffdSoft\ufffd
\ndeterminism believes that the premise is false. The proponents of this view
\ncontend that our dilemma is a false one, primarily because we have insisted on
\ntoo strict a definition of free‑will. The soft determinists redefine free‑will
\nas the free action we discussed in
\nhere<\/a><\/span>. They reject the notion of an
\ninner power or faculty called the will as a metaphysical fiction. All that is
\nnecessary for a person to be morally responsible is for that person to be
\nunrestrained in what they truly want to do. Halverson calls the free‑will of
\nthe soft determinist a \ufffdcircumstantial freedom of self‑ realization\ufffd as opposed
\nto the \ufffdnatural freedom of self‑ determination\ufffd of the radical free‑will
\ntheorist.<\/p>\n
\nThis view and soft determinism are called \ufffdcompatiblist\ufffd theories
\nbecause they reject the second premise in the extended deduction above. In
\ntheir respect their respective ways, they believe that universal determinism and
\nfree‑will are compatible. Soft determinism differs significantly from
\nteleological compatiblism in that it rejects any teleology and accepts only one
\ntype of causation, the \ufffdupward\ufffd causation of mechanistic views. This is
\nsometimes called \ufffdefficient\ufffd causation, the causation of pushing and pulling.
\nTeleological compatiblism is based on Whitehead’s metaphysics, in which every
\nactual occasion (AO) is a self‑determining agent that seeks its own end. (Click
\nhere for more on Whitehead’s views.) In one speculative blow, Whitehead solves
\nthe dilemma of free‑will and determinism by declaring a universal
\nself‑determinism. Most AOs seek ends which are very trivial: like the end of
\nsimple conformation to the past or simple alternation, physical behavior which
\nshows up, e.g., as a sine wave on an oscilloscope. But some AOs, those which
\nmake up the mind, seek and achieve true novelty and therefore are the basis of
\nhuman creativity and moral responsibility.<\/p>\n
\n <\/b><\/p>\n
\nTYPICAL \ufffdLIVES\ufffd OF ACTUAL OCCASIONS<\/b><\/p>\n
\n PAST PRESENT FUTURE <\/p>\n
\nConformation: A1 <\/sub>A2 <\/sub>A3
\n<\/sub>A4 <\/sub>A5 <\/sub>A6 <\/sub>A7 <\/sub>A8
\n<\/sub>A9 <\/sub>A10 <\/sub>A11 <\/sub>A12<\/sub><\/p>\n
\nAlternation: A1 <\/sub> B1 <\/sub>
\nA2 <\/sub>B2 <\/sub>A3 <\/sub>B3 <\/sub>A4
\n<\/sub>B4 <\/sub>A5 <\/sub>B5 <\/sub>A6 <\/sub>B6
\n<\/sub>A7<\/sub><\/p>\n
\nNovelty: C E P P E
\nC D ? ? ? ? ? ?<\/p>\n
\n(Note: The novel events are not completely arbitrary or chaotic.)<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\nWhile the final causation of each AO may truly be called a
\nnatural freedom of self‑determination, this teleology does not happen in a
\nvacuum. Human freedom in process philosophy is not as radical as that which we
\nfind, e.g., in existentialism. It is not ex nihilo <\/i>and not hostile to the
\npast nor to natural or social limits. Just as in Popper’s interactionistic view,
\nWhitehead accepts the role of the \ufffdupward\ufffd causation of efficient cause, but an
\nefficient cause is interpreted as an incarnation of the cause in an effect that
\nis a self‑determining agent. Each concrescing AO is inescapably a product of its
\npast and surroundings, but it is also able to synthesize this data according to
\na telos<\/i> of its own. Final causes stem directly from a causally
\nefficacious environment, but the difference is that the environment does not
\ndictate the particular effects but only conditions a personal agent who is the
\nlocus of the final cause. The actions of personal agents are their own unique
\nunification of the past according to their own desires.<\/p>\n
\n <\/span><\/p>\n
\n
\n<\/span>Whitehead has actually resurrected all four of Aristotle’s causes. In
\naddition to the final cause inherent in each AO and the efficient cause of the
\npast, there is \ufffdcreativity\ufffd as the \ufffdmaterial\ufffd cause and God as the \ufffdformal\ufffd
\ncause offering the divine initial aim. Whitehead’s solution to the problem of
\nfree‑will is without doubt ingenious, but the speculative metaphysics which
\nsupport it can be subjected to the criticisms formulated in the article.
\n<\/span>It is instructive to compare this Whiteheadian proposal with Hick’s idea
\nof humans having \ufffdlimited creativity.\ufffd Hick explains: \ufffd…Whilst a free action
\narises out of the agent’s character, it does not arise in a fully determined and
\npredictable way. It is largely but not fully prefigured in the previous state
\nof the agent. For the character is itself partially formed and sometimes
\npartially reformed in the very moment of decision.\ufffd3<\/span><\/sup> This is also a
\nrejection of freedom ex nihilo<\/i> and a process view.<\/p>\n
\n <\/p>\n
\nEndnotes<\/span><\/p>\n
\n <\/p>\n
\n1<\/span>. Martin Buber,
\nI and Thou<\/i>, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Scribner’s, 1970), p. 100.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\n2. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love<\/i>, p. 312.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\n3<\/span>. Ibid., p. 313.<\/p>\n
\n <\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Incompatiblism and Compatiblism: Four Views on Free-Will and Determinism The following extended deduction allows us to draw out various alternatives to the problem of free‑will. Each view will respond differently to these premises. 1. The thesis of universal determinism…<\/p>\n